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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Circuit Court of tite United States, for the First Circuit, Ihode
Island. June, 1852.
JOHN P. NESMITH et. al. V. THE DYEING, BLEACHING AND CALENDERING
COMPANY.
1. A factor who accepts a bill, drawn against a particular consignemnt of mercban-
dise, which has been so far executed as to be placed in the hands of a third person
to be delivered to him, acquires thereby a property in the goods, which-will en-
able him to maintain replevin against an attaching creditor of the consignor, to
whom the officer making the attachment had delivered the goods.
2. No bill of lading, or other formal document, is necessary to create the title in
such tase, nor is it necessary that the depository should be employed by the con-
signee, nor that he should know the particulars of the consignee's title.
This is an action of replevin, for a quantity of cotton cloth.
It appeared that Daggett & Co., manufacturers, at Attleborough,
Mass., who had been in the habit of employing the plaintiffs as
their factors in the city of New York, wrote to them on the 4th
of February, 1852, that they had that day delivered 500 pieces of
cloth to the defendants, to be colored into cambrics, and had di-
rected them to insure the goods and send the plaintiffs a policy with
a receipt for the goods, and requesting the plaintiffs to accept a bill
which they had drawn on them at six months date. They also de-
sired the plaintiffs to order the colors of the cloths. On the same
day, Daggett & Co., wrote to the defendants, at Providence, R. I.,
advising them of the sending to them, by railroad, of 300 pieces of
cloth, to be made by the defendants into cambrics for the plaintiffs,
and to be forwarded to the plaintiffs when finished. They added
that they should send 200 pieces more on that day, and desire the
defendants to send to the plaintiffs that afternoon a receipt for 500
pieces, together with evidence that they were insured for the plain-
tiffs' account; and they inform the defendants that the plaintiffs
will order the colors. On the 5th of February the defendants wrote
to the plaintiffs that they had received 500 pieces of cloth from
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Daggett & Co. to color, &c., for cambrics, and had at their request
effected insurance thereon, payable, in case of loss, to the plaintiffs;
and they applied for and obtained this insurance "for and on ac-
count of the plaintiffs' loss, if any, to be paid to them. On the
6th of February the plaintiffs wrote to Daggett & Co., acknowledg-
ing the receipt of their letter of the 4th of February, and saying
they suppose the cloths are of the same quality as others they
have sold, and if so they will accept the draft; and on the same
day they wrote to the defendants, acknowledging the receipt of
their letter of the 5th of February, and ordered the colors and
mode of packing the cambrics. On the 13th of February the bill
was presented to the plaintiffs for acceptance and by them accepted,
it having been previously negotiated by Daggett & Co. On the
10th of March, Daggett &-Co. having failed in business, the de-
fendants caused these goods to be attached, as security for a debt
which Daggett & Co. owed them; the goods were not then com-
pletely finished, and the attaching officer delivered them to the
defendants.
It was agreed that upon these fact the Court should determine
whether the plaintiffs can maintain their action.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by CURTIS, J.
The question is-whether the plaintiffs, at the time the attachment
was made, had a property in these goods which would enable them
to maintain replevin, against one holding them under an attachment
as the property of Daggett & Co.
The facts show that the parties intended to vest in the plaintiffs
are interested in these goods as security for the reimbursement of
the money which by their acceptance they engaged to pay for
Daggett & Co. Independently of any particular expressions oc-
curring in the correspondence, such an intention is fairly inferrable
from the very nature of the transaction. A request made by a
principal to a factor to accept a bill, because the principal has
'placed merchandise in the hands of a third person, to be insured for
the benefit of the factor, and forwarded to him for sale, carries
with it an implication that the parties intend that the factor, if he
accepts, may look to the goods for his reimbursement; and if this
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implication is not centrolled, it is sufficient, so far as the mere in-
tention of the parties can govern, to confer on the factor a corres-
ponding interest in the goods. In case at bar this intent, derivable
from the nature of the transaction, is not controlled, but is much
strengthened by the language of the correspondence. When Dag-
gett & Co. sent the cloths to the defendants, they informed them
that they were to be made into cambrics for the plaintiffs, and
forwarded to them; that they were to be insured for the plaintiffs'
account, and they request the defendants to send to the plaintiffs
evidence that the goods had been thus received and insured. This
was accordingly done, and the bill was accepted because it was
done. Now, although it is clear that a mere intent of a consignor
to vest a special property in his factor, to secure him for an ad-
vance on account of a particular consignment, even if the advance
is made on the faith of it, will not create any legal property in the
factor, yet it is otherwise when the particular goods have been set
apart, in the hands of a third person, who has undertaken to deliver
them to the consignee, and the latter has advanced, or accepted,
upon the faith of such an arrangement. The decisions of Court
of Exchequer, in Bryans v. Nix, 4 Mee. & Wels. 775, and of the
Supreme Court of New York, in Holbrook v. Wright, 24 Wend.
169, Grosvenor v. Phillips, 2 Hill, 147, fully support this position,
as does also Sumner v. Hamlet, 12 Pick. 76.
It was attempted to distinguish this last mentioned case from the
one now under consideration, because th parties there both agreed
that the depositary should act as the plaintiffs' agent; but I con-
sider that in this case, although Daggett & Co. originally employed
the defendants, and were to pay them for finishing the goods, yet
when the plaintiffs were apprised that the defendants held the
goods for them and assented thereto, and when the defendants were
informed that the goods were to be finished for and sent to the
plaintiffs, and by accepting the goods for these purposes gave their
assent to execute them, all parties, including the defendants, agreed
that the defendants should act as the plaintiffs' agents so far as
respected the custody for and delivery to the plaintiffs of these
goods.
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It is true the defendants did not know why the goods were to be
delivered to the plaintiffs. The information given to them by Dag-
gett & Co., when the goods were sent, that they were to be finished'
for and sent to the plaintiffs, and insured for their account, would
rather indicate that the plaintiffs were the absolute purchasers.
But this is not material. It is not necessary that they should know
the inducement which led to the arrangement, or the particulars of
the plaintiffs' title. They knew what they had themselves agreed
to do, whici was in effect to hold the goods for the plaintiffs, and
this was sufficient. I know of no principle, or decision, which re-
quires more; a)ad in none of the cases referred to above, except the
one in 12 Pickering, was notice to the depositary of the nature
of the title of the creditor, an element in the decision. If the de-
positary undertakes to act for a third person, and receives the pro-
perty under such an undertaking, he must execute it, unless pre-
vented by a process of law founded on a title superior to that of his
principal, and it is not for him to say he did not know that his
principal had a good title.
This would be otherwise, if notice to the depositary were a ne-
cessary element in the title of the consignee ; but it is not. That
title rests upo i the intent of the parties to create and vest a pro-
perty in the goods, upon the valuable consideration parted with by
the factor on the faith of that property, and upon the execution of
that intent by setting apart the particular goods in the hands of a
third person, to hold for the factor; thus placing them out of the
control of the general owner, and within the control of the factor,
so that he can exercise and have the benefit of his ownership. And
therefore, I am of opinion that the cases in which it has been held
that a delivery to a carrier under a bill of lading consigning the
goods to a factor, who has accepted an account of them, does vest
a property in the factor, are all authorities in favor of the plain-
tiffs; for they do not depend upon any particular efficacy of a bill
of lading, any further than that document manifests the intent of
the parties to have the carrier hold the property for and deliver it
to the factor. Hfaile v. Smith, 1 B. & P. 536; Anderson v. Clarke,
2 Bing. 20; Shelpherd v. Pope, 6 Alabama R. 690.
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That the right of a factor to a lien cannot rest on a bill of lading
alone is clear, from Patten v. Thompson, 5 I. & S. 350; and in
Bryans v. Nix, 4 I. & W. 790, Mr. Baron Parke declares in
terms what that case required, that there is no difference as respects
this question; between a bill of lading and any other competent
evidence of the purpose and acts of the parties.
Perhaps some confusion exists from confounding the property
acquired by such an arrangement as was made in this case, with
the lien of a factor. It is correctly said, that actual possession by
the factor is necessary to his lien; and when the goods have been
pladed in the hands of a depositary employed by the owner, to be
delivered afterwards into the actual possession of the factor, it can
hardly be said that the latter has actual possession of the goods,
and so, it is argued, he cannot have a lien as factor. But the pro-
perty acquired by depositing the goods in the hands of a third per-
son, under an agreement that they shall be delivered to one who
has advanced money or negotiable paper on account of them, and
shall be by him sold, is something more than a lien. The legal title
to the property may be considered as passing to him for the pur-
poses indicated by the agreement. Such is the view taken by Eyre,
C. J., in the leading case of Raile v. Smith, and I perceive no
sound reason for doubting its correctness. It relieves transactions
of this nature from all difficulty arising from the want of actual
possession by the factor, and places them upon the same footing as
absolute sales to bona fide purchasers, so far as respects the vesting
of the title intended to be created. In my judgment, this result is
in accordance with the interests of trade, and with the usages of
commerce, and allows only a.just and safe effect to the agreements
of parties.
My opinion is, that the plaintiffs had a property in these goods
on which the action of replevin may be sustained and the judgment
must be in their favor.
Judgment for Plaintiffs.
Cozzen8, for Plaintiff.
Carpenter & HZoppin, for Defendants.
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Circuit Court of the United States, for Third Circuit, November,
1852.
SUTTON et al. V. THE ALBATROSS.
1. The receipt of a new note, without a fresh consideration, is not satisfaction of in
account or a waiver of a lien, unless accepted as such; and of this a receipt "in
full" is onlyprimafacie evidence; open to explanation. Jone3 v. Shawhain, 4 W. &
S. 26.3, approved.
2. A material man having a lien in rem against a domestic vessel, took from the
owner, before all the work was completed, notes for the whole of his account
against him, including repairs furnished to other vessels, and signed a receipt
"in full" therefor. From the circumstances it appeared that the object of the
former was not to obtain negotiable security, but to prevent a dispute about his
account, and that the receipt had been given as a form, without the attention of
the parties being at all drawn to it. Held that there was no waiver of the lien.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States, sitting in
Admir'alty.
This was a libel by Sutton & Co., Steam Engine and Boiler
Makers, of Philadelphia, against the Steamship Albatross, a do-
mestic vessel, for machinery and repairs furnished to her between
the 15th of November, 1851, and the 1st of January, 1852, under
a contract with her owners, the Philadelphia and Atlantic Steam
Navigation Company; the amount claimed being about $1600.
The answer of Ambrose W. Thompson, for himself and others,
assignees for creditors of the Steam Navigation Company, after
setting forth the assignment, admitted that the work and materials
were furnished as stated in the libel, but alleged by way of defence,
that on the 16th of December, 1851, James T. Sutton, one of the
Libellants, called on Thompson, then President of the Company,
and requested as a personal favor, that he should be permitted to
render his bill for work and materials up to that time, so that it
might be examined and settled for by note, before Thompson re-
signed from the Presidency of the Company, as he then contem-
plated doing; Sutton urging as a reason for his request that
although all the work was not completed, they (the Libellants) were
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in want of paper, and if Thompson should resign, they might be
delayed in obtaining a settlement.
The answer then stated, that persuaded by these reasons, and for
the purpose of accommodating Sutton, the Respondent consented,
- and that Libellants accordingly furnished their bill, which embraced
every item mentioned in the account annexed to the Libel, upon
which four notes of different dates at four months each, were ex-
ecuted for its amount, in the name of the Company,; and that the
Libellants then gave a receipt in these words:
"Received, Philadelphia, Dec. 16, 1851, from the -Philadelphia
and Atlantic Steam Navigation Company, their four notes of Nov.
17th and 26th, and Dec. 6th and 16th, amounting to thirty-six
hundred and forty-five dollars and eighteen cents, at four months,
in full, for repairs of Steamships to this date.
$3,645 18. JAMES T. SUTTON & CO."
The answer submitted thereupon, that these notes and receipt
were a waiver by the Libellants of their lien against the vessel, and
that consequently that lien was forfeited and abandoned.
No formal replication appears to have been filed.
The only evidence in the ease was the deposition of Samuel T.
Pierce, who had been Superintendent of the Company, and in
charge of their books. The material parts of his testimony are as
follows:
"Mr. Thompson was President of the Company in December,
1850. I was present at an interview between M r. Thompson and
Mr. Sutton, in relation to the work on the 16th December. Mr.
Sutton rendered his bill for work against both the Albatross and
Osprey, up to that date, and requested that MIr. Thompson would
- close it by notes, previous to his resignation, and the rest of the
Board; as, if that was not done, a new Board might raise some
dispute or difficulty, which he wished to avoid. Mr. Thompson ex-
amined the account, and requested me to draw four notes for the
amount, in equal portions, and to take Mlr. Sutton's receipt for
them. That is all I recollect that passed. I drew the notes and
took the receipts. The notes were given at the request of Mr. Sut-
ton, on account of the Directors being about to resign. Mr. Sut-
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ton's mode of dealing, account and settlement, with the Company,
six months settlements; first of January and July-for repairs. I
5.ay for repairs, because contracts for building are different ; they
are settled when they are finished.
"'Mr. Sutton requested this settlement as a favor, on account of •
the expected resignation. He requested it prior to the usual time
of settlement, for the reason I have mentioned.
"They actually resigned, subsequently, but their resignations were
refused by the Stockholders."
On cross examination, the witness stated that Mr. Sutton's ac-
count was a running account; that by the words 1 their course of
settlement" he meant what he learnt from the books, as well as his
own knowledge, admitting that he had never been present at any
interview hetween Sutton and others, on behalf of the Company,
as to how he was to be paid for his work, except on the day when
the notes were given; and that no notes were given under these six
months settlement, except those on the contracts.
It is to be remarked, that the notes received by Sutton were never
negotiated, but were brought into Court at the hearing, and sur-
rendered; and that the receipt was a mere printed form, filled up
by the Clerk.
The lien claimed by the Libellants, was given by the Acts of
Assembly of Pennsylvania, of 1836 and 1837, with regard to the
attachment of vessels. (Purdon's Dig. 90, 92.)
The District Court, on the hearing of the case decreed for the
Libellants, for the full amount of their demand, with interest and
costs; from which decree the Respondents appealed, when the case
was argued by
St. Geo. T. Gampbell, for Libellants.
G. I. Wharton and Balch, for Respondents.
GRIER J.-That the libellants had a lien on the steamboat Alba-
tross for their bill of repairs, by the statute laws of Pennsylvania, is
not disputed. The only question is, whether they have relinquished
that security by taking the notes of the owners. In solving this
question, there is also no difficulty as to legal questions affecting the
case. Taking the note of hand of the debtor, is not, per se, legal
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satisfaction, unless there is evidence that the parties intended it
should operate as such.. Where the debtor has two securities, as
in the present case, it will not be easily presumed that he has vol-
untarily relinquished one of them, and that the best of the two.
The giving the receipt for the notes, as in full of the account, it is
true, is primafacie evidence, that such was the case. But a receipt
is no estoppel ; and when we consider how little attention is usually
paid to the peculiar form or expression of such documents, signed
by mechanics, and drawn up by the clerk of the employer, such
formal words may be easily rebutted, by showing the true nature of
the transaction. The note taken is no higher security than the ac-
count, and unless the transaction shows an intention to surrender
without consideration, the better security, these formal words in a
receipt given, when the account is settled, ought not to be considered
as at all conclusive of an intention to receive the lesser security as
satisfaction. The case of Jones vs. Shawhan, 4 Watts & Serg. 263,
is directly in point, and states the law as applicable to this case.
The law as laid down in that case is this-a new note with-
out a fresh consideration, is not satisfaction of an account, or of a
preceding note, unless it has been accepted as such ; and though the
presumption is, that a larger security is not exchanged for a smaller
one, yet a receipt taken for the lesser security, as "in full," is but
evidence to go to the jury to subvert such presumption. But it is
not conclusive, and when opposed by the presumption, it may be
explained by showing that there was no contract to take the lesser
security and release the better, and that the intention to accept it
as satisfaction, and relinquishment of another security, was not in
the contemplation of the parties. In this Court, the duty of find-
ing these facts, cannot be devolved on a jury; and on careful ex-
amination of the evidence; I am convinced that the libellant when
he signed the receipt, had not the idea before his mind, of releasing
any security held by him; nor did the officer with whom this set-
tlement was made, contract for any such release, or that the notes
should be received in actual satisfaction.
In the first place, it does not appear that notes were demanded
for the purpose of having a merchantable security on which to raise
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money, or that they were used for that purpose. They are brought
into Court and surrendered. Secondly, the libellants called for a set-
tlement of their accounts, not for the purpose of getting immediate
payment, by note, but to have the account settled and adjusted be-
fore Mr. Thompson and the officers who had dealt with libellant,
should send in their threatened resignations. The notes were given
as evidence of the amounts of the balance due on settlement, says
the witness "on account of the Directors being about to resign."
When the account was stated and adjusted with the President of the
Company, he ordered the clerk to draw these notes and take a
receipt of them. No direction was given to the clerk in what form
to draw the receipts, either by Thompson or Sutton. The clerk
drew it in the usual form. Sutton signed it without noticing its
form, or perhaps reading it. His object was to get his account
settled, so that he might not have difficulty with the officers of the
corporation. No suggestion was made by either party, that these
notes were either wanted to raise money on, or given as favors, or
received as a satisfaction of and other security held by the mechanic.
There was no consideration given, or intended to be given for the
relinquishment of one of the mechanics' securities, nor did such an
act enter into the contemplation of either of the parties at the time
of the settlement. The clerk drew the receipt in the usual form in
his receipt book, without any instruction from either party to put it
in any particular form, and thus made it have an apparent effect
which was not within the scope of the contract, or contemplation of
the parties.
Upon a more careful examination of the case, I feel satisfied that
a jury would have been justified in finding that it was not the inten-
tion of the parties to this settlement, to give or receive these notes
in satisfaction of the debt, so as to relinquish the security on the
vessel, given by law to the libellants.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.'
I The authorities on the question of the effect of a negotiable security taken for
an antecedent debt, which are numerous and conflicting, are collected and ably dis-
cussed in the notes to Cumber v. Wain, 1 Smith, L. Cases, [146] ; and to Swift v.
Tyson, 1 Am. Lead. Ca. 191.
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Nvew York Supreme Court, Shankland, 3Mason, Gray and
CriTpen, . J. May Term, 1852.
AUGUSTUS MORGAN V. JOHN FREES.
Evidence is admissible to show that the principal witness for one of the parties
in a cause, had been guilty of an attempt at subornation of perjury therein, in
order to affect his credibility. Harris v. Tippett, 2 Campb. 637, and People v.
Genning, 11 Wend. 18 doubted.
This Was an action to recover damages for a breach of warranty,
on the sale of a horse.
Benjamin T. Miller, a witness for the plaintiff, and who had acted
as his agent in the purchase, having testified to the warranty, and
breach, was asked, on his cross-examination, whether he did not at-
tempt to hire one Webster to impeach a witness who was called for
the defendant to disprove the alleged warranty. Miller swore that
he did not. The defendant then called the said Webster as a wit-
ness, and proposed to prove by him that said Miller had made such
attempt to suborn him. This wos objected to by plaintiff's counsel,
and excluded by the Court, and the defendant excepted to such
ruling.
SHANKLAND, J., (after stating the facts:)
I am of opinion that the evidence was proper, and should have
been received. It directly tended to depreciate the credibility of
the witness.
It is true, that in ifarris v. Tippett, (2 Campb. 637,) Lawrence,
J., held, that on a witness denying that he had dissuaded another
witness on the opposite side from being present on the trial, evi-
dence to contradict him on that point would not be admissible; but
in Yewn's case, (2 Campb. 638,) the same Judge held, that it was
not irrelevant, on the trial of a prisoner, to cross-examine the wit-
ness to the fact, whether in consequence of being charged with
robbing the prisoner, he had not said that he would be revenged
upon him, and that, if the witness denied using such a threat, evi-
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dence might be given to contradict him. Whether the above deci-
sions can both stand together, is doubtful, but most clearly, that
first one is not sustained by the prior and subsequent cases, nor by
principle.
On the trial of Lord Stafford, proof was admitted, on the part of
the prisoner, that Dugdale, one of the witnesses for the prosecution,
had endeavored to suborn witnesses to give false evidence against
the prisoner. 7 Howell, St. Tr. 1400. So, in the Queen's case,
(2 Broderip & Bingham, 310, 6 E. C. L. Rep. 160.) it was held, by
all the Judges, in answer to a question propounded by the House
of Lords, that when a witness, in support of a prosecution, has been
examined in chief, and been asked in cross-examination, as to de-
clarations and acts of his, to procure persons to give evidence in
support of the prosecution, it is competent to the party accused to
examine witnesses in his defence, to prove such declarations and
acts in contradiction of the witness, but not so, if the first witness
had not been first cross-examined on that point. See, also, 1 Phil-
lips' ,v. (4th Am. ed.) 295; and leagoe v. Simmons, 3 0. &
P. 75.
So, the conduct of a witness, shewing a bias in favor of a party
calling him, may be shown to lessen his credibility. Daggett v.
Tallman, 8 Conn. Rep. 168; 1 Starkie on Ev. 129, 1830.
So it was held, in Atwood v. Welton, (7 Conn. Rep. 66,) that a
witness, on his cross-examination, may be inquired of, whether he
had not had a controversy with the party against whom he testified,
and whether he has not threatened to be revenged on him, for the
purpose of discrediting his testimony; and if his answer is in the
negative, it may be contradicted by other witnesses. The inquiry
is not collateral, but most important to show the motives and tem-
per of the witness in the particular transaction. The witnesses,
state of mind, and interest in respect to the party, are always per-
tinent, because they go to his credibility. 16 Mass. R. 185;
Swift's ,v. 148; 1 Star. Ev. 135; 19 J. R. 115, 123; 4 Wend.
420; 1 Co~v. and Hill's Notes, 765; 4 Leigh, 330; 1 Excheq. R.
90.
The case of The People v. Genning, (11 Wend. 18,) in which it
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was held, that the prisoner could not prove that'the prosecutor had
'frequently offered to leave Court, and not appear as a prosecutor,
if the prisoner would settle the subject matter of the indictment
with him, was so decided, on the ground, that if it was true, yet it
would not, in the slightest degree, influence the Jury, or impeach
the testimony of the witness. On that ground, the case was pro-
perly disposed of, on principle; but I exceedingly doubt the correct-
ness of the assumption, that it could not legitimately affect the
testimony of the witness. It might be quite material, on the ques-
tion of the prosecutor's motive in prosecuting, and whether he had
not adopted that mode of attack in order to procure money.
But, in the present case, the offer was, to prove that Miller, the
principal witness for the plaintiff, had attempted to suborn another
person to swear falsely in the cause; and it seems to me, no
stronger evidence could possibly be adduced, to show the motives
and feelings of the man, than this evidence, and I am of opinion a
new trial should be granted, with costs to abide the event.
New trial granted.
Supreme Court of PennsyZvania, October, 1852.
IN RE NATHAN RAMSEY'S ESTATE.
1. Where R., who died in 1837, had executed a will in 1819, wherein he devised
one-half his real estate "to his legal and natural heirs and their heirs forever, to
be divided among them in equal shares, to be share and share alike.
' Held, that
only those who would have been heirs under the act of 1833, came within the de-
scription, and therefore, that children of deceased nephews and neices did not take.
2. Under a devise to "heirs," the estate vests in those who answer that description
at the time of the death of the testator. Where a term of known legal si nification
is used, the Courts will consider that the testator used that term in that-recog-
nized sense, and will so construe the will.
Error from Orphans' Court of Cumberland County.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
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LEWIs, J.-The will of Nathan Ramsey was executed on the 8th
of October, 1819, and the testator died in 1887. He devised the
half part of his real estate "to his legal and natural heirs and their"
heirs forever, to be divided, among them in equal shares, to be share
and share alike." If the testator had died in 1819, at the time of
making his will, the children of his nephews and neices would have
answered the description of "heirs," under the law then existing.
But at the time of his death, in 1837, they did not answer that de-
scription, inasmuch as the act of 1833 abolishes the" right of repre-
sentation among collaterals, after brothers' and sisters' children.
And the question in this case, is whether the decedent intended to
give his estate to those who would answer the description of
"heirs," according to the law existing at the-time of making the
will, or to those who were recognized as heirs by the law in exist-
ence at the time of his death,
It cannot be pretended that the estate was given to those who
would have been his heirs had he died at the time of making the
will. Such a construction would defeat the children of Richard
Wood altogether. He was living at the date of the will, but died
before the testator, and the latter died before the enactment of the
statute of 1844, which, under 'other circumstances, might have
saved a devise to Richard Wood from becoming void by his death
before it vested.' And the effect of this construction would be to
give to each of the nephews, and the children of nephews, a share
equal to the share of the testators own brothers and sisters. This
could scarcely be supposed to 'ccord with his intention, for the
latter were nearer in degree to the testator, and may fairly be pre-
sumed to have been the preferred objects of his bounty. In the
case of a testator who was married, a still more startling effect
might be produced by such a construction. Children might be born
afterwards; but these would be entirely excluded, because they
were not in existence to answer the description of "heirs" at the
time required by this construction; and the whole estate would
thus go to collaterals in remote degrees, who happened to answer
the description of "heirs" at the time of making the will.
I But see Martindale v. Warner, 3 Harris, 471.
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This construction is, therefore, entirely inadmissable. It is clear,
that the testator looked to the time of his death, as the period when
the estates were to vest. But the main question still remains:
What individuals were intended to take them ? Those who filled
the description of "heirs" according to the law existing at the date
of the will, or those who answered that description under the law
existing at the death of the testator? The intention must control.
There can be no "heirs" in the life of the ancestor, and the use
of this term is a strong indication that he had no particular pcrsons
in view as the favorite objects of his bounty, and that he looked to
the period of his death as the time for ascertaining the persons who
were to take under that description. When he made use of a term
of known legal signification, and one which cannot, according to
the rules of law, apply to any persons but those who answer that
description at his death, we are bound to believe that he used the
term in its legal sense, unless there is something in the will to indi-
cate a contrary intention. Smith's Executory Int. see. 211, part
2, ch. 2. We have no right to interpolate a word for the purpose
of reading his will as a devise to the presumptive heirs, and thus
deprive the "legal heirs" of the estate expressly devised to them.
In Baskin's Appeal, 3 Barr. 307, it was decided that the statute
of distribution is to be resorted to, in the case of a bequest to "1 all
the heirs," for the purpose of ascertaining "1 who are to take, and
the quantum of the estate." In Powell on Devises, 282, n., the
rule is stated, that "where a devise or bequest is simply to a testa-
tor's ' next of kin,' it vests in thosd who sustain the character at his
death." And the same rule prevails even where the devise is to a
person for life, or for any other limited interest, and afterwards to
the next of kin. Powell on devises, 284, n., 1 Cox, 131; 3 B. C. C.
234, 4 ib. 207; 3 East. 278; 3 Mer. 689. Where words of gene-
ral description are used, they must be considered as referring to the
death of the testator, "unless by the context, or by express words,
they plainly appear to be intended otherwise." Powell on devises,
286, n.; Smith's Ex. Int., s. 214, pt. 2, ch. 2. In the will before
us, there is nothing to take the case out of the general rule of con-
straction. And it is important to the peace of society, and to the
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stability of titles, that we should not, for light causes, depart from
the general rule of construction, which, under a bequest or devise
to "heirs," gives the estate to those who answer that description at
the death of the testator.
It is ordered and decreed, that the decree of the Court below,
ordering the decree of the 12th February, 1850, to be so amended
"that the complainants (below) receive from the executor of the tes-
tator the sum of $74,0OJ, with interest from the 12th February,
1850," be reversed.
And it is further ordered and decreed, that the decree of the
12th February, 1850, be affirmed.
iSupreme Court, Pennsylvania, September, 1852.
THE NEW YORK AND ERIE RAILWAY V. SKINNER.
1. An action on the case for negligently conducting a Railway train may be main-
tained; as to what constitutes negligence, quwre.
2. A Railway Company is a purchaser for valuable consideration of the exclusive
use of the land, over which the track is laid, as an incorporeal hereditament, and
may use thereon the greatest allowable rate of speed, without interference from
strangers.
3. By the common law of Pennsylvania, as well as by the cemmon law of England,
the owner of cattle is bound to keep them within his own custody at his peril,
though he may let them go at large without incurring liability from entry on un-
enclosed woodland orwaste field, and this because of the peculiar circumstances
of the people here.
4. A judge's charge to a jury mu't be accurate, not only in its outline, but also in
its detail, or this court will reverse on error.
5. The principle in Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311, affirmed and enforced.
6. A Railway Company is responsible only for negligence or wanton injury, and the
owner of cattle killed or injured on their track, can have no recourse to the Com-
pany or its servants ;-and such owner is liable for damages done by his cattle to
the Company or its passengers.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas, of Susquehanna County.
The plaintiff below declared against the defendant, in trespass on
the case, alleging that in consequence of the negligence of the de-
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fendant's servants in conducting and running their engine and cars
on their railway track, the engine ran upon and over a cow of the
plaintiff, and killed her.
It appeared on the trial that the cow in question was at large, on
a narrow piece of unenclosed land, between the railroad of defen-
dant and the public highway, about sunset of one day in May or
June, 1849, when the mail train came along, running up to their
regular time of twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. When about
one hundred yards distant, the cow was seen and the whistle was
sounded, the engine reversed, and signal given to brake; but the
cow sprang on the track and the engine ran on to her, and one or
two cars were thrown partly off the track.
Defendant's counsel requested the Court to charge the jury "that
if they believe that the plaintiff's cow was suffered to stray upon the
public highway, and that from thence she came upon the railroad
track of the defendant, and was there run over and killed by their
locomotive engine, the plaintiff cannot recover, even though there
were negligence on the part of the defendant.
"That the plaintiff's cow, under the evidence in this cause, was
trespassing on the land and railroad track of the defendant, and
therefore the plaintiff cannot recover, even though there were negli-
gence on the part of the defendant."
The Court, JEssuP P. J., declined to charge as requested, and this
was assigned as error.
Mr. J. T. Riclards, for the plffs, in error, cited Fort v. Wisnell,
14 Johns. 304, Plater v. Scott, 6 G. & J. 116, Travis v. Smith,
1 Barr. 234, Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow. 78, Bust v. Low, 6 Mass.
94, Vanderplank v. Miller, M. & M. 169, Barnes v. Cole, 21 Wend.
188, Bathburn v. Payne, 19 Id. 399, TWynn v. Allard, 5 W. & S.
524, Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 320, Tona. B. B. v. Munger, 5
Denio, 255, Knight v. Abert, 6 Barr. 472.
September 27, 1852. The opinion of the Court was delivered
by
GIBSON, J.-An action for such an injury as is laid in this declara-
tion, is founded on negligence, of which there was not a particle of
proof at the trial. The company was using its chartered privilege in
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the usual way, and its act was lawful. Doubtless an action on the case
may be maintained for negligence in conducting a railway train as
well as in conducting any other vehicle, as was ruled in Bridge v.
The arand Junction Bailway, 3 M. & W. 244; but what is such
negligence has not been entirely determined. In Aldridge v. The
Grreat Western Raiway, 4 Scott, N. R., 150, S. 0. 1 Dow], N. S.
247, an action was maintained for suffering sparks to fly from the
engine to a bean stack; and this is all we have for it in the shape
of decision. No doubt a company is answerable for gratuitous dam-
age, but what evidence was there of such damage in this case?
Absolutely none. The testimony is consistent, and it shows that
the train was going at the usual speed: that it was within three
hundred feet of the spot where the cow jumped suddenly from the
ditch to the track: that the engine was instantly reversed, and the
signal given to brake; and that alacrity could do no more. The
retropulsive power at the disposal of the engineer was applied in
vain. Had he been able to stop the train in time to save the cow,
he could not have done it without periling the passengers. Grant-
ing what one of the witnesses testified, that the cow might have been
seen at the distance of fifty rods by the way side, and granting that
the train might have been stopped within it; yet the engineer was
not bound to stop it.' He had no reason to apprehend that she would
leap into the jaws of death, or that it was necessary to anticipate her.
But high above this stands the impregnable position, that a rail-
way company is a purchaser, in consideration of public accommoda-
tion and convenience, of the exclusive possession of the ground paid
for to the proprietors of it, and of a license to use the greatest al-
lowable rate of speed, with'which the person nor property of another
may interfere. The company on the one hand, and the people of
the vicinage, on the other, attend respectively to their particular
See a curious case in North Carolina, Herring v. the Wilm. and Ral. Rail Road
Co., 10 Ired. 402, where two slaves, who were lying asleep across the track, were
killed by an engine passing over them. It was held that the fact of the killing
did not raise a presumption of negligence; for inasmuch as the slaves were
reasonable beings, the driver of the engine might presume they would get out of the
way.-Eds. Am. L. Rey.
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concerns, with this restriction of their acts, that no needless damage
be done. But the conductor of a train is not bound to attend to
the uncertain movements of any assemblage of those loitering or
vagabond cattle, by which our railways are infested. Any other
rule would put a stop to the advantages of railway travelling, alto-
gether. And, for what deprive the country of one of the best im-
provements of this most wonderful age ? For no more than to en-
able a few unpastured cows to pick up a scanty subsistence in waste
fields and lanes. If the bullocks, cows, horses, sheep, or swine of
the neighborhood, were allowed to block the way, the prohibition of
intrusion by drovers or travellers using their own means of convey-
ance, would be of little use. For the sake of the company and the
passengers, the conductor and subordinates will be vigilant to
remove obstructions; but the protection of the property is merely
incidental. If the owner of it do not attend to it, the company's
servants, having their own business to mind, are not bound to do so;
and he who trusts his property to the chances of accident, is bound
to stand the hazard of the die. Knight v. Abert, 6 Barr. 472, is
to the point. In that case the intrusion was on wood land; in this
it was on the exclusive possession of ground paid for as an incor-
poreal hereditament.
So far, we have treated the case as if the plaintiff's skirts were
clear; but they are not. By the Common Law of England, an
owner of cattle is bound to keep them in an enclosure, or in custody,
at his peril; for every entry by them on another's possession, is a
trespass; by the Common Law of Pennsylvania, he may letl them
go at large without incurring liability for an entry by them on
woodland or a waste field.-To entertain an action for inappreci-
able injury, would encourage vexatious and unprofitable litigation,
and be contrary to the maxim de minimis, which is peculiarly ap-
propate to the circumstances of the people here. But if such an
intrusion would occasion substantial damage, the English rule would
be applicable to it, on the principle that the owner of a bull which
has gored another's ox, must pay for it. Is not the intrusion of an
animal on the railway, which has a direct tendency to throw a train
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off the track and endanger life and member, an injury to persons
involved in the risk? It is conceded that an American company is
not bound to fence its railway, as an American farmer is bound to
fence his fields, and this shows that persons who suffer their cattle
to go upon it, do so on their own responsibility. Every English
railway is fenced-not to protect it from cattle, for none are at
large; but to prevent detriment or detention from other causes.
In a country so new and so sparce as ours, of which the trunks of
the principal railways are more extensive than the Island of Great
Britain, the cost of fencing them would be greater than could be
borne. The rights and responsibilities of a people are shaped by
the circumstances of their condition. If they will have railways,
they must be content to have them in the only way they are prac-
ticable: and the English rule must be applicable to them. If an
owner suffer his cattle to be at large, it must be at the risk of losing
them or paying for their transgressions. The very act of turning
them loose, is negligence, as regards any one but an owner of a
forest or waste fields ; and the owner of them is consequently re-
sponsible to every one else. That he is not answerable for them to
a railway company criminally, like a caitiff, who has laid a log or a
bar across the track, is because mischief was not intended by him.
But no prudent man in his predicament, would be the first to make
a stir about it.
The charge was accurate in its-outline, but not in its detail. As
has already been said, there- was no evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant, yet the existence of it was left to the jury as a
debatable matter. In another part, he even took the fact for
granted. "The simple fact," he said, "of permitting for a limited
time, the cow to wander on the Railroad, would not of itself, be
such negligence as to excuse all negligence on the part of the de-
fendant." Had there been evidence to raise the point, the direc-
tion might have been well enough; but the application of the prin-
ciple in the particular instance, was wrong. In Sills v. Brown, 9
0. & P. 605, it was ruled that in cases of accident with carriages or
ships, mutual negligence, if contributive to the injuryI, bars an action
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for it-a principle enforced by this court in Simpson v. Hand, 6
Whart. 311.-But it was erroneous to predicate it of a case in
which the negligence was all on the side of the plaintiff. He fur-
ther charged, "That if the plaintiff kneiv his cow was wandering
on the railroad, it was his duty to drive her therefrom. He had
no right to suffer her to be there ; and if he suffered it, knowing her
to be there, he was guilty of such negligence as would prevent his
recovering. But if his cow casually wandered away, ordinary care
being used to restrain her, the simple fact of her being on the track
would not excuse the defendant's negligence." Now the making of
this gratuitous imputation of negligence and the ignorance of the
cow's whereabout, turning points of the cause, is the root of the error.
As loss of the property is not a penalty for the owner's supineness
in the care of it, of what account is his ignorance of its jeopardy.
The irresponsibility of a railway company for all but negligence
or wanton injury, is a necessity of its being. A train must make
the time necessary to fulfill its arrangements with the Post Office
and the passengers, and it must be allowed to fulfill them at the
sacrifice of secondary interests put in its way; else it could not ful-
fill them at all. The maxim of Salus populi would be inverted;
and the paramount affairs of the public would be postponed to the
petty concerns of individuals. Every obstruction of railway is un-
lawful, mischievous and abatable at the cost of the owner or the
author of it, without regard to his ignorance or intention. It may
seem cruel to make a dumb beast suffer for the fault of its owner;
but it must be remembered that the lives of human beings are not
to be weighed in the same scales with the lives of a farmer's or a
grazier's stock; and that their preservation is not to be left to the
care which a man takes of his uncared-for cattle. Aliowing them
to prowl for their food, he may not wash his hands of the conse-
quences of it. In a country so obnoxious to the charge of indiffer-
ence to human safety, it is a high and holy charge of the Courts to
hold to their duty, not only those to whom it is immediately com-
mitted, but also those by whose defaults it may be remotely en-
dangered; and to hold them hard. We are of opinion that an
owner of cattle killed or injured on a railway, has no recourse to
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the company or its servants; and that he is liable'for damage dome
by them to the company or its passengers.
Judgment reversed.
NoTn.-According to the well and long established principles of the common law,.
the owner of a close is not obliged to fence against the cattle of the occupant of an
adjoining close. Every man must keep his cattle on his own land, and prevent
them from wandering on that of his neighbor. It is true, that no man is bound
to fence his land, in the absence of statute regulation or prescription, against an
adjoining field, but he is bound to keep his cattle upon his own close at his own
peril, and a fence has been found the most convenient mode of so doing, and hence,
in well settled districts in this country, even in the absence of statutes, has been
generally adopted. Further, if a man be bound to make fences, his duty extends
only as against his immediate adjoining neighbor, or some person having an interest
in the contiguous close, but not as against strangers; and hence, if the cattle of a
mere stranger escape into the close, from defect of fence, trespass lies.'
A man has a right to drive his cattle along the highway to market, or to and from
his pasture ground; and in doing so, they may wander out of the lines of the road
and get upon adjoining lands that are not protected by front fences; and perhaps
such vagabond movements of the cattle would hardly amount to a trespass, or
at any rate, would fall within the principle de minimis; or, if a litigious plaintiff
should bring an action, he would recover only nominal damages. But, as between
the landholder and a stranger, in the absence of statute regulation, or custom or co-
venant, the landholder is not subjected to the onus of putting up a fence to protect
himself against the cattle of one living at a distance, whose land does not adjoin his
own, and who chooses to pasture his cattle on the highway at the public expense and
annoyance, and who does not choose to keep them on his own close. Between such
landholder and cattle owner there is no mutuality that requires the former to pro-
tect himself against the latter, and the latter would undoubtedly be liable for every
injury the cattle might commit, either in an action of trespass, or by distress damage
faiantS
'See the old books and cases cited in Rust v. Low, 6 Mass. R. 90.
2 Chambers v. Mathews, 3 Harr. N. T. Rep. 368 ; Coxe v. Robbins, 4 ialst. 385:
Lord v. Wormwood, 22 Maine, 282; Vandegrift v. Redeker, 2 Amn. Law Jour. 118,
S. C. 2 Zab. N. J. Rep. 183; Stafford v. Ingersoll, 2 Hill, N. Y. 38; Lyman v.
Gibson, 18 Pick. R. 427; Dovasten v. Payne, 2 H. Black, 527; Rust v Low, 6 Mass.
90; Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Id. 33; Tonawanda R. R. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 267, per
Beardsley, Ch. J. ; Wells v. Howell, 19 Johns, 385 ; Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow. R. 79,
note; Clark v. Brown, 18 Wend. 213; Little v. Lathrop, 5 Greenl. R. 356; Gale and
Whateley's Law of Easements, 297. The folloiing general proposition is deduced
by Judge Cowen, as the result of a careful examination of the authorities: "Every
man is bound, under peril of being accountcd a trespasser, to keep such animals as
are the subject of absolute property, upon his own soil." See 1 Cow. Rep. 01 rote.
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It is said the common law on this subject has never been in force in Illinois, and
that the owner of a close must have it fenced in order to maintain an action of tres-
pass for injury done by cattle. See Seely v. Peters, 5 Gilman, 130. Caton, -I.,
however dissented.
If cattle trespass on improved land, which is not srrounded by a statute fence,
the owner of the land may drive them off, and may set a dog upon them, providing
lie is not wanting in ordinary care and prudence, either in the size or character of
the dog, or the manner in which he pursues them. Clark v. Adams, 18 Verm. 425.
The application of these principles to railways is not difficult. It is the duty, and
it is a duty for which an action would lie, or an indictment might be found, of a rail-
way company to construct their track and run their locomotives and cars over that
track in such manner and at such speed as the wants of modern commerce and social
improvement demand. And if in the progress of things, anew and powerful agent,
such as steam, is subdued by man's genius to become a useful and active laborer in
his behalf, all that can reasonably be required of one, who uses an agent so potent
and so dangerous, is to exercise all reasonable skill to prevent injury to the property
of third persons. Engines and cars in rapid motion are lawfully passing over their
appointed pathway. This pathway is owned by the railway corporation, either in
fee, or it is liable to a servitude or easement, which, practically, is the same thing.
The land upon which the road is built, is as fully the property of the corporation as
the land of an adjoining owner on which lie grows his wheat, or mows his grass.
And the same principles of law must be applied to each. In the absence of statutes
or covenants, or prescription, the railway company is not bound to fence in their
land, and in long lines of railway in a new and thinly peopled and ill timbered coun-
try, the expense would be intolerable and the outlay comparatively useless.' , The
owners of adjoining lands and strangers are bound to keep all cattle off the railway
track, as much as they are bound to keep them off of each others farms; and
should they fail to do so, they must respond in actions for all consequent injury.
2
I It has been held in Maine, that the fact that a railroad company have built
fences along the line of their track against the land of an adjoining property holder,
is not of itself evidence.of any obligation on the part of a corporation to either
erect or maintain fences for the benefit of such adjoininglandholder. Morse v. The
Boston and Maine R. R. Co. 2 Cushm. 536.
2 Vandegrift v. Redeker, 2 Am. Law Jour. 116, S. 0. 2 Zab. 183; Tonawanda R.
R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 258; Perkins v. The Eastern R. R. Co., 29 Maine, 304;
Clark v. The Syracuse R. R. Co. 5 Month. Law Rep. 277; 11 Barb. Rep. S. C.
"The railroad track, when appropriated, is not subject to the same rules as ordi-
nary highways; the company has the exclusive use of the land for the purposes of
their incorporation. The owner of the fee retains no right to the use or occupation of
the ground for pasture or otherwise. The object and scope of the appropriation is
wholly inconsistent with the owner retaining any rights or interests in the use of the
land during the period for which it is appropriated." Per Bennett arguendo, 4 Comst.
R. 356-7, and per Hurlbut, J., p. 357.
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District Court, City and County of Philadelphia, September, 1852.
JOEL CADBURY V. CATHARLNE DUVAL.
1. A creditor by Judgment, though for contemporaneous advances, is not a purchaser
within the Recording Acts, nor is he protected against a trust of which he has
had no notice.
2. Trustees for the payment of debts under a codicil to a will, conveyed land to
D. the testator's widow and executrix, who had been given a life estate there-
in by the will. The conveyance was nominally for value, but in fact no considera-
tion passed, and it was merely made for the purpose of vesting the legal estate in
D. to enable her to raise money to pay the testator's debts. The widow gave a
mortgage on -the property, under which it was sold. Held, that the land was
bound by the trust in the hands of D., and that her judgment creditors, standing
in no better position than herself, were not entitled to be paid out of the pro-
ceeds remaining after the payment of the mortgage, as against the creditors of
the testator.
James S. Duval, by his will, dated the 18th of March, 1842,
after certain specific devises to his children and grandchildren, be-
queathed to his wife Catharine Duval, the rest of his property and
estate; the rents and profits .thereof, after paying his debts, to be
appropriated to her support during her lifetime; and over the sur-
plus of the said rents and profits, over and above her support, if
any, he gave his wife a power in trust for distribution among his
children and heirs, the terms of which are not material. He also
appointed his wife executrix. By a codicil of the 22d of March,
following, Mr. Duval devised all the residue of his real estate wher-
ever, situated, subject to the life estate therein of his wife, to trus-
tees in trust to sell, then to apply the proceeds first to -the
payment of any of his debts, to which the same might be subject,
" and is not otherwise provided for," and then to distribute the
surplus among his children.
The testator died in the same year, and on the 27th of the succeed-
ing December, the Trustees under the codicil, executed a conveyance
of certain of the residuary real estate, in fee, to Mrs. Duval, recit-
ing the receipt of an actual money consideration to a large amount.
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As will appear hereafter, however, nothing was actually paid by
Mrs. Duval, and the sole object of the conveyance was to put the
legal title in her, thus merging her life estate, to enable her in her
personal character to raise money to pay the testator's debts. In
February, 1843, Mrs. Duval mortgaged the land thus conveyed tr,
her, to secure a bond for $7,000, to William Parker. Subsequently
to this mortgage, and between the years 1844 and 1847, a number
of judgments were recovered against Mrs. Duval, for debts con-
tracted by h4er personally.
In March, 1848, Parker's mortgage was sued out, part of the
land sold, and the proceeds paid into Court. The question arising
whether the mortgage, or creditors of Mr. Duval, who had obtained
judgment within the five years, were entitled to the mnoney, the
Court awarded it to the former; and this decision was affirmed on
appeal, and may be found in 10 Barr. 268. A pluries levari facias
was then issued (in 1850,) and the remainder of the mortgaged
premises sold. The fund thus produced was also paid intoC ourt,
and referred to an Auditor, who reported that after the discharge
of the balance due to Parker, the fund was claimed on the
one hand by the creditors of Mr. Duval, and the judgment creditors
of Mri. Duval, on the other, and that the latter had demanded
issues. These issues, as subsequently settled, were in substance as
follows :
1st. Whether for the conveyance by the trustees to Mrs. Duval,
any money consideration passed between the parties.
2d. Whether the sole object of the conveyance was, by putting
the legal title in her, to enable her to raise money to pay the debts
of the estate.
3d." Whether there was before, and at the time of the convey-
ance, a verbal agreement and private understanding between the
parties, that after the arrangement had been accomplished, Mrs.
Duval should re-convey to the trustees her legal estate for the pur-
pose of the trust.
4th. Whether such re-conveyance was ever made.
5th. Whether the judgment creditors of Mrs. Duval, had at the
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time their respective claims became judgments, notice or knowledge
in fact of the verbal agreement and private understanding.
Upon the trial of the issues, the jury found the second of them
in the affirmative, and the rest in the negative.
Rules were thereupon obtained to shew cause.why the creditors
of Mr. Duval should not take the money out of court, which were
argued by
Mr. T. I. Wharton, for the rules.
Mr. IF. S. Price, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Horn, contra.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
HARE, J.-James Duval devised certain land to his wife
Catharine Duval, for life, by his will. By a subsequent codicil,
he devised the same land, subject to her life estate, to his sons-in-
law, in trust to sell it, and after applying the net proceeds to
the payment of his debts, to distribute the surplus among his
children. This devise passed a reversionary interest to the
trustees, 6ubject to an express trust for the payment of the
testator's debts, and a life estate to Mrs. Duval, charged with
a lien for the same debts by operation of law. Subsequently
the trustees conveyed the interest devised to them to Mrs. Duval,
by a deed, which purported to be in consideration of $7,000. Had
this consideration been real, the deed would have been a full execu-
tion of the power, and would have discharged the land from the
trust, and passed a clear and unincumbered title to the grantee. In
point of fact, however, no money was paid, the object of the convey-
ance being to enable Mrs. Duval to execute the trust declared by
her husband, to the best advantage, by selling her life estate, as
well as the residuary interest devised to the trustees. The trusts,
therefore, survived the conveyance, and bound the estate in her
hands as if no conveyance had been made. For nothing is better
settled than that a conveyance will not defeat a trust, unless the
grantee buy without notice, and for value; and here the grantee
gave no value, and was indisputably affected with notice. The
land was afterwards mortgaged by Mrs. Duval, and subsequently
sold under a levari facias, issued on the mortgage. The Supreme
Court decided, when the case was before them, that although the
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trust bound the land in the hailds of Mrs. Duval, it did not bind
the mortgagee, who was a bona fide purchaser for value. He ac-
cordingly received the amount of the mortgage out of the proceeds
of the sale, and the question now is, as to the proper distribution of
the residue, which is claimed on the one hand by the creditors of
Mrs. Duval, and on the other by those of her husband. This ques-
tion seems to admit of a plain and easy solution. The general rule
is, that the rights of those who claim by a derivative title, rise no
higher than the rights of the person through or under whom they
claim. Thus, the purchaser of Real Estate has to submit to the
defects of the title of the grantor, and cannot protect himself by
showing that he bought in ignorance of their existence. The pur-
chaser of a chattel, cannot ordinarily resist a suit brought by the
rightful owner, even where the vendor was in possession of the
chattel at the time of the sale, and held himself out as the owner.
And the assignee of a chose in action, is well known to be bound
by all equities which bind the assignor. When, howevbr, a pur-
chaser parts with value on the faith of the legal title of the vendor,
he is not bound by equities of which he had no notice at the time of
the purchase. This exception to the general rule is as well settled
as the rule itself, and is necessary to prevent the refined and intri-
cate system of trusts, which are obligations of conscience, rather
than rights of property, from becoming a clog and burden on the
free transmission of property from hand to hand.
What we are to determine in this case, therefore, is whether the
Judgment creditors of Mrs. Duval come within the exception or
within the rule; whether they claim merely through and under her,
or have a new and superior title, which puts them in a better posi-
tion than she occupies.
That she could not claim this fund for her own purposes, as
against her husbands creditors, is evident; that she could not apply
it to pay her debts to the exclusion of his debts, is also evident, and
the question simply is, whether her creditors can insist on applying it
to a purpose to which she could not apply it herself. Now it has been
settled by a train of decisions in England, which come down from
the origin of Equity there, and has been repeated and established
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in this country by other decisions which extend as wide as the
country itself, that a Judgment creditor is within the rule and not
within the exception; that he has the rights of the debtor, and has
no more, and that he cannot compel the debtor to disappoint the
prior and superior claims of others in order to discharge the debt.
In other words, it is settled that a Judgment Creditor is neither a
purchaser in the technical or limited sense in which the term is used
in equity, nor in that in which it is used in the recording acts
of this country, and must stand or fall by the real, and not by the ap-
parent rights of the defendant in the judgment. It is, however,
contended that a judgment obtained for an antecedent debt, and
one given for contemporaneous advances, are on different footing,
and that the one should be viewed in the same light -with a Mort-
gage, whatever may be the effect of the other. One answer to this
is, that a man who advances money to another, has a right to dic-
tate the security, and that if he choses to accept a Judgment which
will bind all the property of the debtor, whether more or less, in-
stead of a mortgage, which only binds that which is specially
mortgaged, he must abide by his choice, and cannot afterwards in-
vest either mode of security with the attributes of the other. And
a better answer is, that if a creditor ask for a mortgage of that
which really belongs to others, though apparently to the debtor, he
will not obtain it unless the latter is prepared to commit a fraud, by
pledging the propery of third persons specificially, for his own debts.
When a debtor has committed such a fraud, a creditor who has
parted with value in good faith, and in reliance upon the fairness of
the security, may enforce it, but when the debtor has not, and per-
haps would not, misappropriate the property entrusted to him for
others, to his own purposes, shall the law, which is supreme reason
and justice, step in to commit a wrong which the parties themselves
have avoided. The case of Struthers v. Peltz, recently decided by
the Supreme Court, is relied on as establishing a different rule, and
as showing that a judgment creditor may have the rights of a
purchaser. Were that case more nearly in point than it is, it would
not justify us in disregarding the uniform course of decision in
this State, sustained by the whole weight of authority elsewhere.
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But the question in that case was not as to the right of a Judgment
creditor to compel the application of a trust fund, to the payment
of the judgment in derogation of the rights of the cestui que trusts,
but as to whether an antecedent lien, which had been released by
executors, to whom the law gave the right to release it, could be set
up by equity against a subsequent judgment, and for the benefit of
legatees and not of creditors. The release of a debt stands on a
very different footing from the conveyance of an estate, and legatees
whose claims originate in the bounty of the testator, and derive
their existence from his will, cannot be viewed in the same light
with creditors whose demands are paramount to the will, as well as
sanctioned by it. We therefore award the fund in Court to the credi-
tors of James Duval, and direct that it be distributed among them
pro rata.
Court of Appeals, Kentucky, October, 1852.
THOMIAS POWELL V. TME FIREMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY.
1. It is not necessary to sustain a bill in Equity for the correction of a mistake in a
sealed instrument, that there should have been a previous application to, and re-
fusal by the defendant to cure the defect.
2. Where a vessel has been stranded before the expiration of a policy of insurance
on her, though the principal part of the damage, as the expense of getting her off,
has been incurred subsequently thereto, the insured is entitled to recover for the
whole loss suffered by him.
3. Negligence or unskillfulness in the master or crew, not amounting to barratry,
will not avoid an insurance, where the loss has been immediately occasioned by a
peril insured against.
4. Where a steamboat is insured for the navigation or a particular river, as the Mis-
sissippi, and not from port to port, the rules as to deviation do not apply; and
therefore, that a loss has been incurred while the boat has been running in an un-
frequented, though navigable channel of the river, will not affect the policy.
5. A surety in a forthcoming bond, given on the attachment of a vessel, in a suit
betwFeen the owners, has an insurable interest in her.
Appeal from the Louisville Chancery Court, PIRTLE CH.
The following abstract of the facts and opinion of the Court in
this important case, has been furnished by a competent authority.
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The Steamboat Mohawk having been seized by virtue of an at-
tachment, issued from the Louisville Chancery Court, at the suit of
a part of the owners against the others, the defendants executeA4 a
bond in the penalty of $16,000, conditioned to have the boat forth-
coming, to abide the decree that the Court might render in the
cause, with Thomas Powell as one of their securities.
Powell obtained from the Insurance Company, a policy on the
boat; having apprized the Company of his suretyship.
The boat was grounded in attempting to run a chute of the Mis-
sissippi river; and Powell, in order to have her got off, (for the
water fell, and she had to be relaunched,) so that she could be
forthcoming, according to his bond, incurred expenses amounting to
several thousand dollars, including wages, board, &c., of persons
superintending and laboring.
The suit was brought in Chancery on an alleged mistake in the
policy. The mistake was acknowledged, but the jurisdiction was
denied, because the Company said it was always ready to correct
the mistake, and no application therefor had ever been made.
The Court sustained the jurisdiction, and decided that it was not
necessary to transfer it from a court of. law to a court of equity,
that there should have been a refusal to correct the mistake.
The greater part of the outlay for the getting off of the boat
from the grounding, was after the time of the policy had expired.
But the Court held that the loss was within the policy, as the
grounding happened before the time expired; and the grounding
was within the policy; and the damage for it was not confined to
the injury done to the boat itself.
It was contended that the boat had been run by negligence and
unskillfulness, upon a bar in a chute of the river, where no prudent
person would run a boat, and out of the usual place in navigating
the Mississippi river.
The Court of Appeals found that it was negligence to some ex-
tent in the pilot, to run the boat in the chute-that the main chan-
nel was the ordinary place of running boats at tlat stage of water;
but went on to make these remarks: "But if it be conceded that
the groundling of the boat was occasioned by the negligence, or mis-
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conduct of the master and crew, it would not follow that the loss is
not covered by the policy. If the misconduct had been wilful and
frebudulent, or the negligence so gross as to bear a fraudulent cha-
racter, it would amount to barratry; and the insurers would not be
responsible for the loss, unless the policy covered the risk of bar-
ratry. The assured is bound to provide, in the outset, a competent
master and crew, but such master and crew, when once provided,
are, to some extent, the agents of the underwriters as well as of the
assured, in relation to their conduct in the navigation of the boat;
and if a loss occur in consequence of their negligence, or other mis-
conduct, which does not amount to barratry, the underwriters can-
not impute the fault to the assured, who performed his duty in pro-
viding a competent master and crew in the first instance. The loss
in this case was directly occasioned by one of the perils insured
against. If its remote cause was the mistake, or imprudence of
the pilot who had the management of the boat at the time, the fault
is not attributable to the assured, and there is no good reason why
it should not be covered by the policy. Barratry is itself regard-
ed as a peril, 'and is not covered by a policy in which it is not ex-
pressly insured against. Not so, however, with respect to mere
negligence, or misconduct, not amounting to barratry: and, there-
fore, the underwriters are liable for a loss by any of the perils in
the policy, of which such negligence or misconduct may be the re-
mote cause.
"Opposite opinions upon this point have been expressed by differ-
ent Courts, and for a time it was regarded as a vexed question; but
the weight of modern authority, as well as the force of argument,
seems to us to sustain decidedly the position we have assumed.
,aters v. Aierchants' Louisville Insurance Company, 11 Peters,
213; Perrin v. Protection Insurance Company, 11 Ohio, 147;
Sadler v. Dixon, 8 M. & Welsb. 895; Shore v. Bentall, 14
Serg. & Rawle, 130; Bishop, ft. v. Pentland, 8 B. & C. 219."
-It was contended, also, that there was a deviation, and, in conse-
quence, no liability. To which the Court replied: "The doctrine
upon the subject of deviation has arisen and been generally applied,
in cases where the insurance was on a particular voyage. Here the
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insurance was not upon a voyage from one port to another, but up-
on the navigation of certain designated rivers, for a fixed period.
The rules applicable in the former case, would seem to have but
little application in the latter. But if an act can be committed in
navigating the rivers covered by the policy, which by varying the
risks insured against, would amount to a deviation, and discharge
the underwriters from liability for a loss occasioned thereby, it
would not consist merely, as in this case, in going out of the direct
and usual channel of navigation, and attempting to pass over a less
frequented, but nevertheless navigable part of the river. If a boat
were to run into a part of the river known not to be navigable, and
where boats never ventured, the risk incurred might be considered
as one not contemplated by the parties, and the loss, if one hap-
pened, as one for which the underwriters were not liable. And if
this act were done without any reasonable cause, or apparent ne-
cessity, it might amount to barratry, as it would furnish at least
primafacice evidence of wilfull and fraudulent misconduct on the
part of the officers of the boat. Bnt the act complained of here,
consisted merely in taking the least frequented route, one, however,
that the same pilot had passed safely along several times during the
same season, and in which the grounding of the boat was entirely
accidental, it being manifest from the proof that the boat could, in
the then stage of water, have passed the bar safely within a few
yards of the place where she grounded. This act, therefore, did
not amount to a deviation; and the loss was one for which the un-
derwriters were accountable."
It was further contended that Powell was not legally one of the
owners of the boat, and eoutd not bring this suit against the Insu-
rance Company, in his own name. To this the Court responded:
"As he was bound for the forthcoming of the boat, he had an in-
terest in its preservation; and although as one of the bondmen, he
did not acquire by the assumption of that liability, any right of
property in the boat, either legal or equitable, yet he had such an
interest in its safety as authorized him to insure it against the perils
of the river; and as he obtained the policy in his own name, having
first disclosed to the insurers his relation to the boat, and his re-
